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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

“Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going?”
— Paul Gaughin

Who are we? Several years after commencing my career-long
comparison of indigenous peoples previously partitioned into
French and British colonies, a psychologically astute colleaguefriend made me realize that, at heart, my subject matter was
identity. Now, identity is a topic that transcends several intellectual disciplines and paradigms. It is also a very personal
matter—which is why I had ostensibly camouﬂaged my personal quest for it by conducting ﬁeldwork in remote locales and
among exotic peoples throughout the developing world. And
I did so as a political scientist! That tension between scholarly
research agenda and subconscious preoccupation was ultimately
resolved (at least on paper) with the publication of my Zion in
the Desert, a study of American Jewish baby boomers who, in
the 1970s and 1980s, opted to become Israeli kibbutzniks in
the Negev Desert.
But every one of us has reason to ponder the randomness of
being bequeathed a particular society, culture, and nation. Relatively few on this planet enjoy the luck of acquiring at birth
the nationality and support system of a developed, high-income
nation. That existential puzzle has nagged at me ever since a
two-year Peace Corps stint revealed both the unmerited luck
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of having been born citizen of a “developed country” and the
corresponding (and humbling) dignity, solidarity, and tenacity of the impoverished majority otherwise allotted the “third
world.” For allowing me to share those reﬂections in extenso, in
My African Horse Problem, I acknowledge University of Massachusetts Press editor Bruce Wilcox.
Three questions undergird the present book: (1) How did discrete indigenous groups (e.g., Melanesian, Hausa, Tamil, Lao),
respond, subvert, and adjust to the respective British and French
colonial projects superimposed onto their society and culture?
(2) In what ways (political, linguistic, economic) have their emergent postcolonial states differed as a consequence of their previous colonial imprints? (3) To what extent are contemporary
world processes, particularly globalization and development,
mediated on the national level by institutional and cultural patterns established during the colonial and early postcolonial eras?
To address these questions, I have conducted grassroots
research in all regions of the world that have experienced the
close-quartered impact of Anglo vs. French colonialism: West
Africa, the West Indies, South and Southeast Asia, the South
Paciﬁc, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. In the Middle East—where colonial/mandate Anglo-French borders were
those of Iraq and Jordan with Syria, and between Palestine
and Lebanon—my ﬁrsthand research into colonial legacies has
been restricted to Palestinian and Israeli Francophones (Miles
1995b; Miles and Sheffer 1998). Since that research is not methodologically comparable to the other cases, I do not include it
in this book.
For all but one of the cases that I do present here, following local language training I spent a minimum of seven months
in the ﬁeld. While my level of ﬂuency has never been the same
across all the relevant languages, in the process I have become
quite comfortable in French, Hausa, and Bislama, and passably conversational in Creole/Kreol, Hebrew, and (at the time)
Tamil. Although my ﬁrst ofﬁcially sponsored research began
xiv | PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Buy the Book

in 1982 in Martinique, my appetite for ﬁeldwork was whetted by a 1976 undergraduate foray to rural Québec under the
supervision of Vassar College geography professor Harvey Flad,
and as assistant to the late anthropologist Horace Miner, to
northern Nigeria in 1980. My two years (1977– 79) as a Peace
Corps volunteer in a town in Niger near the border with Nigeria were also formative in honing a sensitivity to postcolonial
Francophone-Anglophone differences. However one dates my
status as a grassroots researcher into Anglo-French postcolonialism, it now spans over a quarter of a century.
For fear of undue academic scrutiny, I hesitate to reveal which
one of the chapters is based on ﬁeldwork falling below my standard threshold of at least half a year in the ﬁeld and reasonable familiarity with the local language. But the truth is that I
know only a few words of Burmese and Lao and that my three
research trips to Myanmar and Laos were each of only a few
weeks’ duration. (A previous visit to Thailand had brought me—
thanks to Kwanchewan and Witoon Buadaeng— to the border
with Burma.) Accordingly, except for the few Francophones I
located in Laos, in Southeast Asia I depended heavily on translators. In instances where I interviewed hill peoples who did not
know their country’s ofﬁcial language, I had to work through
double layers of translation. The ensuing loss in direct access
to informants was frustrating. I trust that the excellent secondary sources upon which I draw for that chapter compensate in
some measure for my regional and linguistic lack of expertise
there. Two of the foremost experts on Myanmar and Laos, Professor David Steinberg and Dr. Martin Stuart-Fox, respectively,
graciously agreed to make improvements on my draft chapter.
I owe debts to numerous other scholars. Colleague-landsmen
who have encouraged me in my cross-regional research include
Professors Bob Charlick, Larry Diamond, Michael Horowitz,
and Lenny Markovitz; Leo Villalón keeps me on my Francophone Africanist toes. Professor Tony Asiwaju of the University
of Lagos has kept me anchored to the borderline perspective
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | xv
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throughout my comparative research; Professor John Paden has
kept me grounded in Nigeria throughout my supra-African peregrinations. So has Dr. Binta Audu. The “psychologically astute
colleague-friend” to whom I referred earlier is David Rochefort. It was Dr. Larry Diamond, above all, who most explicitly
put it to me, during a beach walk in Mauritius in 1997, that I
ought to begin integrating all my separate ﬁeldwork cases into a
synthetic whole. I resisted—for about a decade. Along the way
I beneﬁted from continuous intellectual exchange, encouragement, and hospitality from former diplomat Jeffrey Liteman and
Dr. Andy Cook. Professor Philip Boucher, former president of
the French Colonial Historical Society, directed me to the University of Nebraska Press on account of its long-standing highquality scholarly imprints on France’s former colonies.
Various institutions have made this work possible. For travel
funding, but more important, the precious grant of time off for
research, I thank Northeastern University. Based at Northeastern
is Terry Beadle, illustrator and map maker for this book, whose
professional expertise, commitment, and camaraderie have been
a boon to my entire career as scholar, author, and lecturer. Students Elvira Josiﬁ and Heather Peltier applied themselves to rooting out bibliographic oversights in the manuscript. For the initial
gift of two years in an African borderland community, I thank
the Peace Corps. The Shell International Studies Research program, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the American
Institute of Indian Studies, the American Philosophical Society,
the Fulbright Program, the National Endowment of the Humanities, the French Government Teaching Assistantship program,
and the Ministry of International Relations and Francophonie of
the Government of Québec have all provided much-appreciated
grants and fellowships. Collegial and intellectual reinforcement
of the value of borderlands studies has come from fellow members (and especially “chiefs”) of aborne, the African Borderlands
Research Network. To round off the ﬁeldwork and kick-start
the writing, I needed the encouragement and opportunity proxvi | PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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vided by the Earhart Foundation, whose patience and support
I acknowledge with much gratitude; thanks in particular go to
Earhart Fellow Research Grant director Montgomery Brown.
Without Earhart, there would be no book here.
Neither would there have been this book without the interest
of the University of Nebraska Press and its anonymous reviewers, who with invaluable suggestions for improvement, endorsed
it. Editors Bridget Barry and Lona Dearmont worked tirelessly
to improve the ﬂow and prose of the manuscript: the remaining deﬁciencies remain mine alone.
In the course of my career’s research, many a Frenchman has
inquired into my attraction to la Francophonie, French colonialism, overseas France. My fascination with former French
colonies has been a subconscious foil, perhaps, for my own country, culture, and history. After all, I tell my students, comparative social science enables us to better see our own society and
nation for what they are. “Does America not have its own history of colonialism? Is the United States not an imperial power
today?” These challenges, put to me by (otherwise friendly)
Frenchmen allergic to my incessant probing of their collective
colonial heritage, have forced me to confront issues otherwise
too close for comfort. “Comparing empires,” as Jonathan Hart
(2003) puts it, “is at the same time an exercise in situating our
own collective selves in imperial history.”
One French national in particular has been an indispensable
spur to my lifelong quest for colonial and postcolonial knowledge. Martinican by birth, ultimately American by choice, Loïza
Nellec-Miles brought to our foyer prenuptial memories of colonial and postcolonial life in Niger, Senegal, French Guiana, and
Tahiti. The fruit of this love, Arielle Pooshpam and Samuel
Benjamin, have already, through their own journeys, begun to
enrich my understanding of the world. They, too, are part of the
intriguing, unpredictable, and never-ending postcolonial story.
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1
Anglo-French Partition and Postcolonialism

[D]ecolonization is a harlot of a word. It pleases so many needs that readers
can never be sure of its real meaning.
— Karl Hack, “Theories and Approaches to British Decolonization in
Southeast Asia”

There are many related words invoked in scholarly settings that,
following Hack, are easily prostituted: colonialism, exploitation,
superpower, discourse, narrative. How neutral, how “objective” (itself a seductive concept), can one be in describing the
operation and aftermath of conquest and overrule? For sure,
ideological dispositions can color one’s use of such terms. But
dueling meanings, I believe, stem less from bad faith than from
academic discipline.
Postcolonial is the terminological bugaboo for this book. As a
political scientist who borrows inordinately from history, geography, and anthropology, I use the word “merely” to describe the
social and political processes following the sovereignty exercised
by European powers (here, British and French) over their African, Asian, Latin American, and Oceanic colonies, protectorates, and territories. In this sense, postcolonialism is intimately
related to decolonization (Hack’s semantic ﬂoozy).
This comparative inquiry into the long-term implications of
French vis-à-vis British colonialism and decolonization, then,
is primarily about identity— that of a large swath of humanity

Buy the Book

who, through no choice of their own, ﬁnd themselves in territories recently under the dominion of France and Britain, the two
major superpowers from the seventeenth until the mid-twentieth
centuries. These colonial powers, moreover, with little regard
for the peoples soon to be under their dominion, apportioned
them to French or British tutelage. What difference, in the long
run, has that arbitrary apportionment made?
What deep institutional legacies (regarding governance, development, education, language policy, and religion) did French
vis-à-vis British colonialism leave behind? What postcolonial
commonalties link former French territories, and British ones,
throughout the developing world? What accounts for the dissimilarities that have arisen? At what junctures has culture
begun to trump history?
To answer these questions with a pretense of scholarly “value
added,” I yoke together four usually disparate clusters of literature.1 The ﬁrst is history: precolonial and colonial history,
accounts of colonial explorers, diplomatic history, social history, histories of French and British imperial rule (and their
respective types of administration), history of decolonization.
For some of the cases, I had the opportunity to consult colonial archival sources, and with others to undertake oral history
of the late colonial era.
Geography is the second cluster of literature that I invoke.
Colonial borders are notoriously arbitrary even if close historical inspection uncovers some surprising contemporaneous
concessions. Boundaries, those totems of political geography,
condition the life prospects of the people born behind them and
divided by them. Partition represents political geography at the
edges of the state, giving birth to entirely new micro- societies:
the borderlands. These political margins crystallize differences.
“Borderline” should not be only an epithet (as in “borderline
personality,” “marginal,” or “barely acceptable”), for it can
reveal starkly different political realities. Anglo-French carving of colonial space is a signiﬁcant geographical legacy: nearly
2 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
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40 percent of the entire length of today’s international boundaries were traced by Britain and France (Imbert-Vier 2011, 13,
following Foucher 1991). Awareness of “where-ness” is critical
to postcolonial understanding.
Thirdly, anthropology facilitates a focus on actual people
and cultures. One of the common sins of both colonization and
conventional histories of colonialism is reiﬁcation of the colonized, including partitioned, peoples. For sure, great anticolonial literature has emerged from such authors as Frantz Fanon,
Albert Memmi, and Aimé Césaire, to cite but a few. But only
anthropology investigates ordinary life for otherwise unheralded ethnic people and peoples, both during colonialism and
after. My forays into and borrowings from anthropology logically focus on those indigenous peoples most directly affected,
in the long-term, by colonial partition. By zooming in on otherwise identical cultures that experienced French versus British colonialism, we can better discern the overarching effects
of these two different systems on otherwise unrelated peoples.
And we should gain a better appreciation of the import of this
book’s theme upon “real people,” not just the erudite intellectuals whose writings are more widely known. I trust that whatever
holes in my arguments professional historians of decolonization may feel compelled to poke are compensated for by a borderland sensitivity that conveys the contemporary perspectives
of otherwise overlooked partitioned peoples.
As Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (2005, 653) aptly observes, “each
social science subﬁeld has its own epistemology of borders.”
The literature and methodology of these other disciplines may
be somewhat remote to students of political science. But that is
indeed my home discipline, ensuring that I retain an overarching concern for the political implications (local, national, international) of my ﬁndings. While acknowledging my debts to history,
geography, and anthropology, this is a career-spanning exercise,
above all, in comparative politics. Through the prism of the borderlands, it refracts foundational precepts of the discipline so vivANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION | 3
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idly expressed by fellow political scientist Crawford Young, as
he reﬂects on “territorial integrity and border sanctity”: “[T]he
elixir of sovereignty hardened the map lines of the colonial partition into a permanent array of containers. . . . [T]he afﬁrmation
of the colonial partition map even sharpened the territorial lines,
now an iron grid of sovereign containers” (Young 2012, 90– 91,
301). The present work advances a further assertion: Borderlands do not negate sovereignty so much as they illuminate it.2
By focusing cross- culturally on ethnic groups partitioned
by colonialism, this book fashions itself as the ﬁrst empirically
grounded comparative study of the legacies of colonialism from
the combined perspectives of political anthropology and political
science. It thereby resolves a problem inherent in the literature
thus far. To the macro-level surveys of Anglo-French colonialism
and decolonization, it advances the role of indigenous cultures
in shaping the outcome of colonial policies and their postcolonial aftermaths. To the case studies that focus on ethnicity, it
magniﬁes the scope by a cross-cultural methodology, comparing the overall impact of Anglo-French partitions in six different world regions. In this light such otherwise universal concepts
as, for example, Mbembe’s “postcolony” (1972) can be examined empirically, using the borderland as illuminating frame.
Why This Book—and Now?

Colonial legacies of the British and French—how archaic this
phrase must sound to thinkers glued to the moment, how seemingly removed from the “relevance” of today’s pressing political issues! But not to all. In a review for Foreign Affairs (2007,
148), Walter Russell Mead acknowledges the ongoing relevance
of Anglo-French rivalry: “The interplay between these two societies has done more to shape the geopolitics, economics, and
culture of the world today than the relationship between any
other two societies on the face of the earth.” Four other impressive books strengthen my conviction that I am indeed joining
colleagues at the crossroads of critical postcolonial thought.
4 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
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The ﬁrst is Crawford Young’s most deservedly prizewinning
The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (1994).
In reassessing the colonialism of Africa in light of comparable
histories elsewhere, Young—who trailblazed such studies with
his 1976 classic Politics of Cultural Pluralism—makes a strong
case for the uniqueness of African postcolonial outcomes.
In a remarkable, far-reaching chapter that foreshadows the
aims of the present book, Young compares colonial and postcolonial Africa with North America and Australasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Micronesia and Korea, Malaysia and Fiji,
Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, Indonesia, Indochina,
Oceania, India, the Philippines, and the Middle East. From his
cross-national colonial comparisons, Professor Young identiﬁes
a “singular historical personality” for Africa vis-à-vis these other
regions, characterized by a “singularly difﬁcult legacy bequeathed
by the institutions of rule devised to establish and maintain alien
hegemony.” While sensitive to French-British colonial differences,
he does not make them his overarching framework. As I intend
to demonstrate, a comparative perspective that does use this lens
tempers the “singular” nature of Africa in favor of a global analysis that continues to privilege, for explanatory purposes, the legacies of distinct modalities of European colonialism.
My efforts to understand the ways in which indigenous societies and former colonies throughout the developing world continue
to reﬂect their respective colonial antecedents echoes Young’s
pioneering work. So do my more focused attempts to perceive
the distinctive French and British stamps that continue to mark
daily life for ordinary people along and behind superimposed
boundaries throughout the so- called Third World.
A second signal work in comparative colonialism and decolonization also takes the end of the Soviet Union as its springboard The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in
Comparative Perspective, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce
Parrott (1997). Several chapters focus on the British and French
experiences as potential previews for what the close of the Soviet
ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION | 5
Buy the Book

era may portend. In it, British and French colonial and postcolonial experiences ﬁgure prominently. For example, Michael Fry
frames British and French decolonization as a Cold War experience that indirectly pitted the Soviet Union against the United
States. Compared with the demise of the Soviet empire, Fry
maintains, it unfolded in a premeditated and orderly manner.
In a subsequent, equally important edited volume Beyond
State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post- Soviet Eurasia in
Comparative Perspective, Professor Young teams up with Soviet
specialist Mark Beissinger to edit a cutting-edge work that again
reassesses the contemporary applications of African colonial history. Shared syndromes— state breakdown and violence, economic collapse, ethnic and gender vulnerability—are identiﬁed
as rooted in colonial and communist institutional patterns.
Although tangential to their overarching thesis, Beissinger and
Young also point out another shared legacy that is essential to
our approach here: the porousness of boundaries, which reﬂects
both their arbitrary origins and (many) states’ inability to exercise meaningful control over them.
A key contribution of Beissinger and Young’s volume lies in its
cross-regional (as opposed to case-speciﬁc) approach. “The issues
that grip Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia transcend region; they
are global in scope” (Beissinger and Young 2002, 5). In like manner, many of my ﬁndings in areas where former French colonies
butt up against former British ones (e.g., smuggling, human trafﬁcking) certainly exist elsewhere, and are no less important for it.
William Easterly’s critique of Western aid to the developing
world, The White Man’s Burden, might not at ﬁrst blush seem
relevant to a reconsideration of colonialism. Yet Easterly sees a
direct relationship between the failures of today’s humanitarianism and yesterday’s imperialism. “The West sowed . . . mayhem with chaotic decolonization,” writes Easterly in his chapter
“From Colonialism to Postmodern Imperialism,” “especially the
arbitrary way the West drew borders.” Part of the white man’s
burden, as he recasts Kipling’s formulation, is the economic difﬁ6 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
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Fig. 1. Democracy and Partition in Former Colonies
From The White Man’s Burden by William Easterly, copyright
© 2006 by William Easterly.

culty of repairing societies rent asunder by partition, even though
“many will deny the relevance of colonial experience to today’s
allegedly more humanitarian exercises” (Easterly 2006, 272).
Easterly statistically examines the relationship between ethnic partition and economic development. Although he does not
distinguish between French and British territories, he ﬁnds that
globally, former colonies containing signiﬁcant proportions
of partitioned peoples perform relatively poorly in delivery of
government services (health and education), transparency, and
rule of law.
Taking literally the image of the colonial bureaucrat who,
oblivious to ethnic reality on a faraway continent, draws a
straight line on a map, Easterly even quantiﬁed boundaries
according to their linearity or jaggedness. His intriguing ﬁnding: “artiﬁcially straight borders were statistically associated
with less democracy, higher infant mortality, more illiteracy,
less childhood immunization, and less access to clean water”
(2006, 293) (see Fig. 1).
ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION | 7
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It is mostly in departments of language, literature, and cultural studies that postcolonial has become an institutionalized framework for analysis. There it is indissolubly wedded to
deconstructionism and other literary devices I do not negotiate
comfortably. The concept that dominates (paradoxically, given
that postcolonialism postulates antidomination) is hybridization, the mixing or blending of cultures previously thought of
as colonized and colonizing. Such a postcultural perspective is
particularly suspicious of language as an oppressive vehicle that
imposes a “master narrative.”
The ﬁrst journal to professionalize this paradigm, postcoLoniaL studies, began publishing in 1998; another manifestation
is pursued by members of the Society for Francophone Postcolonial Studies, whose journal Francophone Postcolonial Studies ﬁrst appeared in 2003. Truth in academic advertising: I do
not situate my study of Anglo-French postcolonialism within
that framework of analysis. This work, deliberately, is a nonFoucaultian social scientist’s take on the postcolonial.3 It intends
to demonstrate that the distinctive stamps of France and Britain
continue to mark daily life for ordinary people along and behind
superimposed boundaries throughout the so-called Third World.
Professional historians might well disagree with this stance.
With the passage of time, and the proliferation of the archival
and other microlevel dissertation, there has been a tendency to
cut away the forest of generality for the trees of speciﬁcity. Some
have come to question the very validity of a stark difference
between French direct and British indirect rule (Dulucq, Klein,
and Stora 2008, 24). The debate is far from over, though, and in
any event, it ought to shift location from archives to borderlands.
Framing Hypothesis

Although spurred by similar motives of national interest (foreign markets, mercantilism, competitive nationalism), Britain
and France placed different emphases on the desired outcomes
among their colonized subjects: technical competence for the
8 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
Buy the Book

former, cultural appropriation (even amour propre) for the latter. “Colonialism was as much a state of mind as it was a set
of coercive practices and system of resource extraction,” notes
Alice Conklin (1997, 248), and the French state of mind was
substantially different from the British.
Despite their formal sovereign status, former French and British colonies—which together encompass more than one-third of
the world’s territory— still bear the underlying imprint of their
colonial pasts. Unlike the pragmatic and mercantilistic British, in their own colonial enterprise the French pursued much
more culturally transformative aims. Even with respect to the
pre-1789 First Colonial Empire holdings in North America, the
Caribbean, and Indian Ocean, a “fusion of imagined administrative responsibility with proclaimed revolutionary purpose
was the foundation of French colonial ideology” (Betts 1991,
17). This fundamental difference— embodied in the phrases
assimiliation and mission civilisatrice— still assumes signiﬁcant, if underappreciated, import throughout the Third World
today. Whereas successor regimes to the British crown have used
their juridical independence to pursue a wide array of postcolonial structures and policies, polities and nations decolonized
by the French Republic have retained a comparatively formalistic, top-down, and centralized approach to governance and
state-society relations.
This dichotomy holds despite basic differences in culture,
geography, and political systems. And as long as it does, the
process of decolonization, as opposed to formal independence,
remains incomplete. But before testing this initial hypothesis on
the ground, we need to acknowledge what specialists of colonial history have to say.4
Although covering a broad swath of time and territory—from
the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, from the New World
to the Golden Triangle— the literature agrees that at least on
paper, British and French policy makers marked their colonial
ambitions and actions with distinctive national stamps. Both
ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION | 9
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powers viewed colonies as requisites for grandeur and sources
of natural and human resources. Both approached their colonized from a position of cultural (if not racial) superiority, placing greater hopes (and making more sacriﬁces) in settler colonies
(e.g., Kenya, Algeria) than in ones without European settlers.
Over time, often in response to external events, both powers
did shift their ofﬁcial implementation strategies. But overall,
whereas the French ofﬁcially assumed the additional obligation
of transforming the colonized into likenesses of France, with
an eventual promise of égalité, the British rarely, if ever, harbored equivalent illusions of assimilating the colonized into their
national bosom. (To take this metaphor literally, contrast the
iconic symbol of the bare-breasted French revolutionary Marianne with staid British photos of the Queen; both can still be
found in diplomatic outposts throughout the postcolonial world.)
The major point of colonial historicist contention is this: on
the ground, did colonial policy matter? Beyond grandiose pronouncements emanating from London and Paris (or even Delhi
and Dakar), in the ﬁnal analysis, did it make a difference to the
colonized? Did lower-level French and British colonial administrators actually implement the policies that supposedly distinguished each from the other? Did partitioned peoples experience
colonialism in substantially different ways? Only if the answer
is yes will we ﬁnd separate legacies that continue to condition
life and politics in the former colonies.
Hack, quoted at the chapter head, discusses the “software of
colonialism: books, languages, customs, judicial systems, social
structures, attitudes” (Hack 2003, 119). However, as with the
digital age, in which there is no uncontested electronic hegemon,
so with colonialism. At the risk of anachronistic analogy, we
may suggest that colonial Britain may have been from Microsoft, but colonial France hailed from rival Apple. Though part
of the same overarching and inescapable network, their successor states continue to ﬁlter and process the world through different operating systems.
10 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
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Although Africa did not experience the earliest or longestlasting colonialisms, it is in this continental context that the
scholarly debate has been most extensive. Perhaps it is because
of the legacy of Lord Frederick Lugard, who, notwithstanding
his distinguished service in India, is remembered for formulating
the doctrine of Indirect Rule as the “model” of British colonization in Northern Nigeria. From the heyday of colonialism in the
1920s until the wave of independence in the 1960s, the debate
over Direct versus Indirect Rule dominated colonial discourse.
Since the 1970s the colonial postmortem has pitted advocates
of the “similarity” versus those of the “difference” schools of
Anglo-French colonialism in Africa. The former deny the overall signiﬁcance, as it affected on-the-ground decisions and outcomes, of supposed differences in French and British colonial
policies: colonialism was colonialism, a mere episode in the
longer evolution of African history. When the similarity school
measures the overall impact of French association, a compensatory colonial policy in the interwar years designed, in direct
contrast with assimilation, to soften the starkly imperial and
chauvinistic implications of Direct Rule, it ﬁnds it wanting.5
Prospects for decolonization reﬂected these differential pathways. Whereas the English could conceive of a trust, granting
autonomy and eventual independence, the French could not
(Betts 1991, 17). This is why, invoking Todd Shepard’s (2006)
felicitous phrase, France had such a hard time “inventing decolonization.” Even France eventually had to bend to anti-imperial
reality, with Algeria and Vietnam providing the most painful
spurs. Still, as Shepard shows in the Algerian case, France not
only resisted to the bitter end the political inevitability of a
breakup, but psychologically resisted it beyond.
Achille Mbembe’s provocative analysis of the African “postcolony” does not engage the Anglo-French colonial debate explicitly, but by seamlessly offering examples of abusive, excessive,
and fetishist power from Kenya (formerly British), Togo (formerly French), and Cameroon (formerly French and British), he
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implicitly embraces the similarity school of postcolonial inheritance. In positing that “decentralized despotism” best characterizes the continuity between late colonialism and postcolonial
administration, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) also implicitly
downgrades the continuity of distinctive European inﬂuences
in France’s and Britain’s former colonies. Longtime specialist
of French colonial policy Raymond Betts seems to be of two
minds on the question.6
Defenders of the difference school accept the traditional understanding of French-British colonial distinctions (à la Oliver and
Atmore 1972, and Gann and Duigan 1969) and maintain its
overall explanatory relevance for African successor states. Adu
Boahen (1987) lends great authority (if debatable details) to their
position.7 Widner (1994) has demonstrated differences, based
on colonial provenance, in the likelihood of sustained competition within newly democratizing political systems. Dimier
(2002, 2004) plumbs the respective national interests of those
who posed the question of colonial differentiation in the ﬁ rst
place. At the level of high diplomacy, contrast the Commonwealth— an older club of independent states over which Britain
exercises desultory control—with La Francophonie, in which
France is still very much in the driver’s seat.8
But how have ordinary denizens of the Third World experienced the aftermath of colonialism? Does having been colonized by France rather than Britain still make a difference to
them? An economist might very well conclude that on average, former British colonies perform better than French ones in
growth and development (Grier 1997), and that a more populist pedagogy (as promoted by colonial Britain) is in large measure responsible (Grier 1999). That does not, however, settle the
score, especially for indigenous peoples who, ﬁnding themselves
on opposite sides of artiﬁcial boundaries drawn by alien powers, were differentially colonized. There is more at stake than
aggregate gdp for national societies: there is also cultural integrity, and national treatment, in postcolonial society.
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The continuing relevance of the colonial paradigm is more
a matter of perspective than a question of empiricism. At the
macro level of change, a focus on freedom or underdevelopment
or globalization may well overshadow distinctions between
inherited French and British structures and mentalities of colonialism. But with respect to middle-level change— say, educational structures or traditional rulership or church/mosque-state
relations—the differences still outweigh the similarities. In any
event, the relevance and repercussions of the debate far transcend the shores of Africa and remain open, despite claims by
some that the similarity school has triumphed. It is at the grassroots in the borderlands, I hope to show, that the national differences in colonialism have changed lives most dramatically.
Problems of Partition

Partition takes different forms. Most common is proximate territorial: either a recognizable river (as in the case of the Mekong,
chosen to divide Laos from Burma) or a geometric line (drawn
through the Sahelian sand to separate Nigeria from Niger).
But maritime demarcations also partition. Think of the islands
of the French West Indies cordoned off from the British West
Indies. In the Indian Ocean and South Paciﬁc, colonial partition has been less territorial than ethnic and psychological: in
Mauritius, British supercession of French sovereignty (dichronous partition) led to institutionalized differences on the same
island on the basis of race; in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), condocolonialism9 mentally partitioned islanders not on the basis
of territory, but with respect to perceived Anglophone and Francophone varieties of religion (synchronous partition).
Those readers more used to the conventional, territorial use of
partition and borders may be bothered by those cases in which I
use the terms in less than literal ways. Rest assured that boundary and borderland specialists have been incorporating similarly metaphorical applications for some time. Moreover, even
for those two cases that I do characterize as experiencing “lines
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in the mind”—Mauritius and Vanuatu— a more conventional
(albeit maritime) colonial partition also persists. Thus, I shall
contrast postcolonial Mauritius with its neighboring overseas
French department of Réunion. Similarly, Vanuatu begs contrast with nearby New Caledonia, which also remains part of
the French Republic. Beyond those familiar maritime demarcations, I still contend that undergoing British rule after French
colonialism in Mauritius, and dealing with dueling colonialisms
in Vanuatu, are the more interesting conﬁgurations of partition
in those two island nations.
Even more than in the realm of science ﬁction, it may be in
the colonial and postcolonial worlds that space becomes the
ﬁnal frontier. Colonialism entailed “respatialization,” not only
with respect to border lines and land use but also in deeper perceptions of place for the colonized. “In reworking the physical
space of the territories into which they moved so as to ensure
and justify their own domination . . . the Europeans forced drastic changes in the local geography of the mind” (Betts 2004,
90). Colonialism forced indigenous denizens to invest old places
with new meanings: thus do sociologists’ and geographers’ formulation of social space ﬁnd pertinent application in colonial
and postcolonial situations.
Touching points for otherwise identical colonially separated
cultures particularly excite me. It is on the periphery, on the
margins of the postcolonial state— often denigrated in the term
“borderline”—that one most clearly captures the long-term legacies of colonialism.10 Rarely have I encountered conﬁrmation of
the conventional wisdom that borderlanders “ignore” the artiﬁcial colonial boundaries that divide them “only on paper.”11
Even where the border itself is invisible, I have been repeatedly
impressed by the extent to which denizens of frontiers do assimilate and therefore legitimate the reality of state differences as
inherited from the colonial era.12
Ethnic partition is not always a surgical cut of a spatially
homogenous group, as with the Hausa of West Africa or the
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Tamils of South India. In the case of Southeast Asia, I examine
as “partitioned” into Laos and Burma (1) minority hill tribes that
were already dispersed, with little preexisting territorial contiguity, and (2) contiguous lowlanders, who had a very loose sense
of unity to begin with. Among some of these peoples, colonial
partition immediately set into motion changes that affected the
peoples so divided; among others, it merely planted the seeds
for wider-reaching dynamics that have been accentuated in the
postcolonial eras. In the West Indies and the South Paciﬁc, I
maintain that ethnic partition also is at work when peoples are
divided not only by geometric cuts of line but by expanses of
water: archipelagic societies were partitioned, too. And in the
case of the Indian Ocean (Réunion, Seychelles, and Mauritius)
we focus on one society, Mauritius, whose colonial partition
was not spatial but temporal: a century of French colonial rule
followed by a century and a half of British colonialism.
For comparative social scientists specializing either in former
British or former French colonies in the developing world, the
framework pursued here illuminates embedded structural constraints that continue to affect the direction and pace of development. By examining legacies of comparative colonialism from
the bottom up, and paying particular attention to the mediating forces of local culture, a much more nuanced understanding of contemporary state and society in the former colonies
of Britain and France emerges. For different cultures react to
colonialism differently.
Borderlands crystallize the differences between the former
colonies; that is why I use them as my methodological frame,
despite the common criticism that I encounter, that border regions
are by deﬁnition peculiar, peripheral, atypical, and otherwise
unrepresentative. “Study the heartland, the urban centers, the
capital,” I am advised. “That is where the essence of a nation
lies.” Undoubtedly, borderlands are special, but it is precisely
the extent to which they nevertheless do reﬂect their respective
states, formally and informally, that they are instructive. One
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can also keep variables more constant between indigenes of the
Mekong River than between the populations of Yangon/Rangoon and Vientiane, or in the case of Hausaland, between the
denizens of Abuja and Niamey. Two broad questions undergird
the inquiry: How did discrete indigenous groups (e.g., Melanesian, Hausa, Tamil, Lao) respond, subvert, and adjust to the
respective British and French colonial projects superimposed
onto their society and culture? In what ways (political, linguistic, economic) have their emergent postcolonial states differed
as a consequence of their previous colonial imprints?
“A retrospective examination,” writes Crawford Young within
the context of the colonial state in Africa, “can illuminate some
of the frailties of its postcolonial successor and perhaps even
suggest avenues of escape from its more burdensome legacies”
(Young 1994, 9). The following chapters aim to advance Professor Young’s laudable goal by harnessing other regions’ experience in comparative colonialism and decolonization. Chief
among the “burdensome legacies,” as we shall see, is the postcolonial inheritance of the artiﬁcial, superimposed boundary.
Plan of Book

After brieﬂy examining several West African peoples separated
by adjoining British-French colonial divisions, the second chapter focuses on the Hausa (Africa’s largest ethnic group), divided
into Niger and Nigeria. Distinctive colonial policies combined
with characteristics of Hausa society created distinct national
versions of ethnic identity. Mostly (but not completely) arbitrary
territorial divisions—the classic “line in the sand”—marked the
partition of West Africa into (mostly) British and French colonies.
Why do slave descendants in the French Antilles today experience a very different reality than do their counterparts in
nearby Anglophone islands? This is the underlying question in
chapter 3. Prior to the partitions outlined in chapter 2, Europeans were already subjecting Africans to distinct versions of
imperial sovereignty: slavery scattered Africans to dozens of
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West Indian islands controlled by Britain and France. In the
Caribbean, France still practices decolonization without independence. Slave-based colonialism bequeathed fewer options
for postcolonial transformation than in colonial lands of ethnically indigenous populations.
Chapter 4 shifts the paradigm to another partitioned ocean,
the Paciﬁc. As in the West Indies, the South Paciﬁc was also
arbitrarily parceled into French and British colonial zones. Here,
however, entire clusters of islands were ruled under single administrations. In one such archipelago, the New Hebrides, France
and Britain agreed to share sovereignty by establishing a condominium. Indigenous Melanesians responded by a policy of
“divide though conquered.” After independence, the archipelago nation of Vanuatu used language and reinvented custom to
transcend inherited colonial divisions. How well has this strategy worked beyond Melanesia?
Whereas Vanuatu experienced concurrent colonialism, in
the Indian Ocean (chapter 5) the islanders of Mauritius underwent consecutive colonialism: French, followed by British. So
why does Francophone culture remain stronger than the one
bequeathed by Britain? Lacking most of the usual preconditions
for democracies—including national unity—Mauritius embraces
its dual colonial heritage for the purposes of managing ethnic
conﬂ ict and promoting development. No wonder the literature abounds with Mauritius as a “model.” I maintain that an
overlooked dimension to Mauritius’s success lies in the hybridic
nature of its colonial heritage, layered by South Asian immigration. The ancestral homeland of most Mauritians is India,
where France remained longer than did Britain. So in chapter
5 I also examine how the Francophone Indians of Pondichéry
compare, especially in their political culture, to their migrant
counterparts in Mauritius. While the anomaly of French India
could have been treated in a separate chapter— it is, after all a
distinct case of Anglo-French rivalry with unique postcolonial
outcomes—the commonality of French colonial inﬂuence over
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ethnic Indians, be it in the Dravidian heartland or Mauritian
diaspora—provides an intriguing frame for parallel treatment.
Chapter 6 discusses how, in all of Southeast Asia, there is
only one border that separates a former French colony from a
former British one: the 150 miles of the Upper Mekong separating Laos from Burma (Myanmar). Dividing the Mekong River
into Lao and Burmese territories affected two geocultural categories of indigenous peoples: those whose territory actually
straddles the riverine boundary and those who inhabit noncontiguous communities on both sides of the international border.
Postcolonial revolution greatly disturbed these spatial patterns,
however, introducing a new variable into the comparative colonialism paradigm. In order to persist, colonial legacies require
a critical threshold of political stability.
Until the concluding chapter, colonial policies are framed
against indigenous group response patterns. In the concluding
chapter, I revisit general questions of ethnicity, history, and variability in colonial policy; the overall diversity in types of postcolonial regimes and patterns of response to them; overarching
regional and geocultural extrapolations; broad differentiations
in material and political outcomes; long-term implications for
languages (ofﬁcial and indigenous); and the possibility of an
overarching borderland message. Despite these generalizing
frameworks, my greater plea is for more empiricism within postcolonial studies, currently an overtheorized, highly abstract, ﬁeld.
When I began this project, I had hoped to personalize a
Rawlsian-type hypothetical: “If you did not know in advance
into which culture or region of the world you would be born,
but could choose between a former French or British colony,
which would you choose?” Although some have used statistical
models to approximate this scenario (is it a postcolonial “prisoner’s dilemma”?), I realize now that the question presents a
false choice. Contingencies— cultural, historical, strategic—are
too multistranded to reduce the Anglo-French colonial grid into
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a single outcome, life choice, or number.13 More important is
the freedom to choose one’s culture and society after achieving political consciousness.
Comparison is also complicated by time, both historical and
ﬁeldwork related. Temporal proximity to events of research focus
certainly skews some cross-national generalization. On one end
of the scale, thirty-ﬁve years had already lapsed between the
juncture when the French West Indies opted to become départements of France (1946) and my ﬁrst visit there. At the other end
of the scale, a mere eleven years separated the independence of
Vanuatu (1980) from my major block of South Paciﬁc research.14
So recent, so fresh was the demarcation between the colonial era
and the postcolonial one that the transition still seemed ﬂuid and
the research in Vanuatu all the touchier. As time passes, some
variables tend to lose their salience as others come to replace
them. The long-term signiﬁcance in British versus French policies of colonization is a case in point. As colonialism became
supplanted by the Cold War and then globalization, the European distinction has lost much currency as an explanatory factor for postcolonial developments. My contention— tempered
by the acknowledgment that decades separate the time from
decolonization and my research in some polities as opposed to
others—is that the Anglo-French distinction still matters a lot
more to partitioned borderlanders than to students of postcolonial history.
That said, the legacies of Anglo-French partition live on in a
wide array of arenas, for larger swaths of the population, in arenas I identiﬁed above: language, education, governance, religion,
and so on. Francophonie remains a societal reference in former
French colonies in a more penetrating way than “Anglophony”
is in former British colonies. I am referring here not only to language use but to conceptualization and institutionalism. Both
forms of colonization were transformative, for sure: in the long
run, though, the French legacies are more constant and identiﬁable than the British ones. This argument holds only in the
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strictly comparative sense: by holding constant for similar ethnic groups who experienced both forms of colonialism.
In offering this global dichotomy of French and British colonialism and its aftermath, I hope the reader will join me in better appreciating the singularity of his or her own historicized
life story. For, in our own way, are we not all postcolonials?

20 | ANGLO-FRENCH PARTITION
Buy the Book

